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Abstract: This paper surveys the literature that uses two-country models to 
analyze monetary and fiscal policy issues faced in interdependent economies. 
We discuss sources of structural interdependence that researchers typically 
include in these models. We describe many of the types of policy interactions 
that researchers have considered and summarize the key results that they 
have obtained. Finally, we briefly explain the limitations of two-country 
models and outline directions that this literature might usefully be extended.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Bryant (1980) forcefully argued that macroeconomic policy 
literature prior to the 1980s had paid insufficient attention to 
international interdependence. As if in answer to Bryant’s call for 
greater consideration of this issue, there has been an outpouring of 
work applying two-country models to problems of exchange rate, 
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monetary, and fiscal policy interdependence and to the possible gains 
or losses of international coordination of macroeconomic policies. Two-
country models are a natural approach to the consideration of open-
economy policy issues.  
 
In this paper we survey a wide range of the literature in which 
such models are employed to examine many problems of monetary 
and fiscal policy interdependence. We focus on theoretical work, 
touching only tangentially on empirical applications (for more detail, 
see Kenen, 1989; Onofri, 1990), and we address the following 
questions. What issues can researchers usefully examine with two-
country models? What conclusions have researchers reached using 
these models? How and why do these conclusions differ?  
 
In the next section we outline the prototypical two-country 
policy model. In Section 3 we discuss the types of structural linkages 
that researchers commonly include in two-country models. In Section 
4 we review the types of monetary and fiscal policy interactions 
considered in the literature and summarize key results that 
researchers have obtained to date. We discuss topics that we regard 
as important areas for future research in Section 5.  
 
2. The essential features of two-country models  
 
We begin by outlining the essential elements of the two-country 
policy problem. This problem was first explored systematically by 
Hamada (1976). A useful starting point for any discussion of two-
country models, however, is the Oudiz and Sachs (1984) model of 
generic policymakers in structurally identical nations. The policymakers 
seek to minimize loss functions, L(M,M*) and L*(M*,M), where L and L* 
denote domestic and foreign policy losses and M and M* give the values 
of domestic and foreign policy instruments. Those who work with two-
country models often equate policy loss functions with social loss 
functions, but doing so is fraught with conceptual problems. One is the 
well-known debate over the existence of well-defined social welfare 
functions. Irrespective of this issue, however, is the potential for a 
policymaker to pursue self-interest rather than the social good, as 
emphasized in the public choice literature. Nevertheless, both the 
public-choice approach and the more recent partisan approach to 
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analysis of policymaking indicate that policy loss functions, under 
many circumstances, are proportional to social loss functions, if the 
latter exist. Models of optimal policymaking typically rely on this result 
as a basis for proposing functions such as L and L*.  
 
As long as the derivatives of L and L* with respect to both M and 
M*  are nonzero, so that each policymaker’s policy instrument choice 
affects the loss experienced by the other nation’s policymaker, there is 
policy interdependence. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that 
the policymakers’ losses are increasing with respect to their own 
instrument choices but decreasing in the choice made by the other 
policymaker, so that ∂L/∂M > 0,∂L/∂M* < 0, ∂L*/∂M* > 0, and ∂L*/∂M < 
0. In addition, suppose that the loss functions are quadratic in the 
instrument choices. Horowitz (1987) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) 
provide justifications for viewing quadratic loss functions as reasonable 
approximations to true measures of losses due to risk aversion or 
forgone consumer and/or producer surplus. Nevertheless, the 
overriding reason for the choice of a quadratic form throughout much 
of the monetary and fiscal policy literature is the gain in expositional 
simplicity, which is a particular virtue in the context of two-country 
models.  
 
With quadratic objectives, the policymakers’ indifference curves, 
which are displayed in figure 1, are elliptical. The slope of the domestic 
indifference curve is equal to –(∂L/∂M*)/(∂L/∂M) and the slope of the 
foreign indifference curve is –(∂L*/∂M*)/(∂L*/∂M). The area of each 
ellipse declines with higher values of the other country’s instrument, 
yielding zero-loss bliss points B and B*.  
 
Noncoordinated policymaking  
 
Under Nash behavior, the domestic policymaker chooses M to 
minimize its loss, taking M* as given, while the foreign policymaker 
chooses M*  to minimize its own loss, taking as predetermined. The 
domestic first-order condition is ∂L/∂M = 0, which implies setting M at 
a horizontal tangency to the domestic indifference curve, and the 
foreign first-order condition is ∂L*/∂M* = 0, which entails setting M* at 
a vertical tangency to the foreign indifference curve. For each 
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policymaker, the set of all points at which the first-order condition 
holds given the other policymaker’s instrument choice is its policy 
reaction (best-response) function, denoted by R and R*, respectively. 
The noncoordinated policy equilibrium is the crossing point, which has 
been normalized at the origin. This is the point at which the reaction 
functions cross, so that each policymaker’s actual instrument choice, 
MN and M*N, is mutually consistent with the reaction of the other 
policymaker.  
 
Coordinating policymaking  
 
Under policy coordination, each policymaker sets its instrument 
to minimize a weighted sum of losses for both nations. Each 
policymaker seeks to minimize the simple sum L + L*, so that 
coordination gains are equally shared. For the domestic policymaker, 
the first-order condition for the choice of M is, ∂L/∂M + ∂L*/∂M = 0, or 
–(∂L/∂M)/(∂L*/∂M) = 1, and for the foreign policymaker, the first-
order condition for M* is, ∂L/∂M *+ ∂L*∂M = 0, or –(∂L*/∂M*)/( ∂L/∂M*) 
= 1. These first-order conditions imply that the mutually consistent 
instrument choices must satisfy the equality, –(∂L/∂M*)/(∂L/∂M) = –
(∂L*/∂M*)/( ∂L/∂M*). The left-hand side of this condition is the slope 
of the domestic policymaker’s indifference curve, and the right-hand 
side is the slope of the foreign policymaker’s indifference curve. Hence 
there is a tangency of the indifference curves at a coordinated policy 
equilibrium, point E in figure 1. The settings ME and M*E comprise the 
Pareto-efficient set, illustrating Oudiz and Sachs’ key point: Other 
things equal, policy coordination, if it can be implemented, is the 
Pareto-efficient policy regime. Note that we follow Branson, Frenkel, 
and Goldstein (1990) and Kenen (1989) by reserving the term 
“coordination’’ to refer to mutual policymaker commitments to 
concrete policy actions intended to attain either insular or common 
objectives. Although policymakers can “cooperate’’ or “consult’’ by 
exchanging information, such efforts entail no precommitment to use 
shared information to avoid policy miscalculations or harmful beggar-
thy-neighbor effects.  
 
As we discuss in Section 5, implementability is an important 
issue. Suppose that the foreign policymaker feels bound to honor a 
coordination agreement but the domestic policymaker does not. Then 
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the domestic policymaker clearly has an incentive to renege, or 
“cheat,’’ on its commitment to coordinated policymaking and choose 
the instrument setting M∁, which yields a lower domestic loss while 
saddling the foreign authority with a larger loss than anticipated. In a 
multiperiod game the likely result would be a collapse of the 
coordination agreement, which would yield a discounted stream of 
losses to the domestic authority due to lost efficiencies in future 
periods. This reputational consideration support the view that 
coordination regimes can be implemented.  
 
A leader-follower regime  
 
A third behavioral mode for international policy-making is 
Stackelberg behavior, in which one (say, the domestic) policymaker 
leads and the other (foreign) policymaker follows in choice of policy 
instruments. Under this behavioral approach, the domestic leader 
chooses M taking into account the foreign policymaker’s reaction 
function R*. Given this choice, denoted MS, the foreign follower’s choice 
then is equal to M*S. This mode of preconditioned behavior is 
preferable to purely noncoordinated policymaking but is inferior to the 
policy-coordination regime for both authorities. For this reason, in 
most contexts, particularly when it is assumed that the countries are 
identical, it is difficult to provide a rationale for the existence of a 
Stackelberg policy regime. As we discuss in Section 5, appeals to 
structural or institutional features germane to a specific policy problem 
typically are required.  
 
A fixed exchange rate  
 
Another type of scheme for policy interaction entails a mutual 
agreement for one nation’s policymaker to fix its policy instrument 
setting as a function of the instrument setting of the other 
policymaker. The foreign policymaker, for instance, may M* fix as a 
function of M and let the domestic policymaker choose M optimally. A 
specific example of this approach to coordinated policymaking is a 
fixed-exchange-rate regime, in which the foreign policymaker M* 
varies as required to maintain an exchange-rate target, leaving the 
domestic policymaker to determine the level and growth of M and, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Open Economies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1998): pg. 265-284. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
6 
 
consequently, trend inflation for both nations. This is not the same as 
the Stackelberg game, because the foreign policymaker in this 
instance does not choose an optimal reaction, most notably in the face 
of disturbances that may affect national losses asymmetrically. In the 
presence of symmetric shocks and given the identical-nation 
assumption, this type of fixed-exchange-rate regime yields the 
coordination outcome illustrated in figure 1, as does an alternative 
regime in which both nations coordinate variations in their money 
stocks to maintain a fixed exchange rate.  
 
The Oudiz-Sachs analysis is an application of theory of one-shot 
games. Nevertheless, it illustrates the fundamental issues that arise in 
two-country policy environments. All that is needed to extend this 
approach to analyses of real-world policy problems is pinning down the 
explicit structure of the policy objective functions and more formal 
modeling of the international environment that the policymakers face.  
 
3. Structural interdependence in two-country 
models  
 
When evaluating how to include potential sources of 
interdependence in two-country models, a model-builder always faces 
a tradeoff between realism and tractability, because solution problems 
typically arise as a result of policy interdependence and resulting 
feedback effects. A common feature of game-theoretic models of 
strategic interaction among economic agents or policymakers is the 
potential for multiple solutions. Of course, in a number of contexts 
there may be multiple theoretical solutions, but only one economically 
feasible solution to a two-country policy problem (see, for instance, 
Bryson, Chen, and VanHoose, 1998). In other contexts, however, it 
could be true that coordination failures and multiple solutions lie at the 
heart of the policy problem (for instance, see Lane, 1990). As 
discussed by Cooper and John (1988), the slopes and shapes of 
players’ response (reaction) functions determine whether players’ 
choices are strategic complements or substitutes, thereby pinning 
down the number of stable equilibria in game-theoretic models.  
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Demand-side linkages  
 
Within any two-country model of monetary and fiscal policy, the 
nature of strategic interactions among policymakers depends largely 
on the sources of structural interdependence that one builds into the 
model. To consider structural interdependence from the demand side, 
most researchers allow for a dependence of home output demand on 
the real exchange rate. Many also include a role for financial-market 
interdependence.  
 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a common assumption in 
models that include a central role for interest rates, either in the 
endogenous determination of other key variables or in the conduct of 
monetary and/or fiscal policies. In the absence of perfect capital 
mobility, balance-of-payments or wealth constraints, together with 
bond-market equilibrium conditions, are needed to structurally link two 
countries’ models economies (e.g., a two-country version of Benavie, 
1983, or Canzoneri, 1982).  
 
Supply-side linkages  
 
In fact, real interest rates influence investment decisions, so 
model-builders often must consider the fact that consumers or firms 
care about consumer price indexes (CPIs). If the CPI is relevant for 
consumption and investment decisions, however, it also should be 
relevant for valuing workers’ real wages and input prices. 
Consequently, another way to motivate structural interdependence in 
a two-country framework is through real-exchange-rate effects in the 
nations’ aggregate supply functions.  
 
Purely from a modeling perspective, the drawback from 
including supply-side inter-relationships is that they introduce a 
number of additional complications. For instance, should wage setting 
be atomistic, in that workers and firms are small enough that they 
perceive that their individual choices cannot influence the CPI and, 
consequently, incentives faced by policymakers? Or should wage 
setting be treated as a centralized undertaking in which national trade 
unions or governmentally managed coordination mechanisms establish 
an aggregate wage bargaining process that helps to determine the CPI 
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and policy incentives directly? Clearly, as Bruno and Sachs (1985) and 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have documented, there are significant 
differences among wage-setting institutions throughout the world, and 
so the answer must depend on the countries under consideration. 
Although little work has explored these issues, VanGompel (1994) 
discusses the importance of pursuing such work, and Bryson et al. 
(1986) have done initial work on supply-side interactions with 
atomistic wage setters. Likewise, Jensen (1993) has explored 
centralized wage setting in a two-country context.  
 
With either demand- or supply-side linkages, the determination 
of the real exchange rate pins down solutions for the nominal 
exchange rate and nations’ CPIs. As a simplification, many authors 
adopt the ex ante PPP assumption, which states that PPP holds on 
average, though unexpected deviations can occur. This assumption 
simplifies solutions of expectational models by tying down agents’ 
expectations via the anticipation that PPP will hold in equilibrium, while 
permitting national policymakers to attempt to influence the terms of 
trade ex ante.  
 
The two-country framework has it roots in typical closed-
economy structures. The international linkage is how the closed-
economy model is “opened’’ to allow for international dimensions. The 
linkage that opens the model determines the extent to which each 
economy is affected by a foreign policy action, a policy reverberation 
or policy spill-over, or the effectiveness of policy and practicality of 
coordination under various monetary and exchange rate regimes. The 
linkage, therefore, preconditions certain outcomes and eliminates 
specific policy options. For example, in a typical theoretical model, UIP 
renders fully sterilized exchange-rate intervention useless.  
 
4. Modeling policy-interactions in two-country 
models 
In many practical contexts, including explicit linkages among 
the policy procedures of the nations’ policymakers is appropriate. This 
situation arises most often when the domestic policy instrument is 
conditioned upon the exchange rate or upon a variable of the foreign 
economy, such as the foreign interest rate or money stock. For 
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instance, if responses of a foreign authority are not fully and 
immediately sterilized by the domestic authority, then nations’ money 
supplies are linearly dependent, which results in nonunique solutions 
(Lane, 1990). This problem can be circumvented by assuming that 
foreign intervention is not reflected in the domestic money rule. This 
assumption requires that foreign intervention is immediately and fully 
sterilized by the domestic authority (see Gros and Lane, 1992, Note 
9), so that money supply rules are asymmetric and unique solutions 
follow. Another approach, which Lane (1989) and Daniels (1997) 
follow, is to specify the exchange rate regime of one economy and 
then derive policy solutions for the other economy. This “ties down’’ 
the value of one authority’s instrument, allowing a unique solution for 
the other authority’s instrument and permitting comparison of optimal 
policy responses across regimes. Explicit policy linkages also arise 
when a domestic policy instrument is conditioned on foreign variables. 
Daniels and VanHoose (1995a) show that lagged foreign monetary 
innovations can provide important intertemporal policy information for 
the domestic authority. In this context, the policy linkage gives the 
domestic authority an additional degree of freedom in its policy 
decision.  
 
Models of exchange-rate intervention  
 
A common issue concerning direct policy interactions in two-
country models is the appropriate degree of exchange-rate 
intervention when nations are structurally interdependent. Typically, 
analyses of this issue are based on models that include policy rules for 
the monetary authorities, with a floating-rate regime (no 
interventions) lying at one extreme and a pure exchange-rate peg 
lying at the other. Although Benavie (1983) considers only a single, 
small open economy, this is a useful paper for understanding models 
of optimal intervention policies, which have similar structures in most 
two-country frameworks.  
 
Good examples of two-country exchange-rate intervention 
models are Canzoneri (1982), Lane (1989), and Gros and Lane (1992). 
Canzoneri derives Poole (1970)-type results from a two-country 
framework and generalizes to a three-country world. Lane considers 
the common view that exchange-rate policy unpredictability should be 
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minimized and reaches the interesting conclusion that one country 
may desire to achieve an optimal degree of unpredictability in order to 
influence the policy regime chosen by the other nation’s authority.  
 
Gros and Lane provide a very lucid discussion of the strategic 
interactions that arise when two nation’s monetary authorities 
condition their policies on exchange-rate innovations. They show that 
the nature of these strategic interactions depends on the sources of 
disturbances, a point often neglected in models that focus solely on 
strategic issues and abstract from stabilization goals that policymakers 
typically pursue.  
 
4.1. Models of monetary and exchange-rate 
coordination  
 
Whether nations could gain from coordinating their exchange-
rate and monetary policies has been a long-standing debate. Two-
country models have proven useful in evaluating the pros and cons of 
policy coordination. Particularly influential models have been those 
developed by Canzoneri-Henderson (1988) and Rogoff (1985a). The 
structural frameworks proposed by these authors share three key 
features. First, they include standard “IS’’ (income-expenditure 
equilibrium) and “LM’’ (real-money-market clearing) relationships, in 
which both the real exchange rate and foreign income affect desired 
spending on home goods. Second, both have a supply-side structure in 
which nominal wages are contracted in advance of labor- and goods-
market clearing. Third, both models follow the bulk of the policy 
literature by exploring policies aimed at stabilizing employment and 
CPI inflation around target values.  
 
Canzoneri and Henderson essentially imbed a structural 
macroeconomic framework into the Oudiz-Sachs game-theoretic 
analysis. Among other things, they consider how monetary policy 
coordination could be welfare-improving for two nations that face 
common disturbances, and they discuss potential mechanisms to 
remove the incentive for a nation to “fink’’ on a commitment to a 
policy agreement, an intertemporal version of their basic one-shot 
policy game. One problem with the Canzoneri-Henderson (1988) 
analysis, which carries over to Canzoneri-Henderson (1991), is that 
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their analysis focuses primarily on optimal stabilization games 
involving strategic interactions only among the policymakers. In these 
games, private agents view policymaker commitments to either insular 
or coordinated policymaking as credible. Furthermore, their 
macroeconomic framework is highly stylized. In one respect, this is a 
virtue. The stylized model is readily amenable to analysis of one-shot 
games. This makes their framework a very useful pedagogical tool. 
Nevertheless, the model does not readily lend itself to standard 
aggregate demand-aggregate supply interpretations, and results from 
the model are not always easily comparable to those that are more 
broadly structured.  
 
Rogoff (1985a) builds directly on the preceding macroeconomic 
literature by constructing a two-country model based on a more 
complete rational-expectations framework that, in contrast with 
Canzoneri—Henderson (1988), includes a role for interest rates. 
Although Rogoff’s model is somewhat more unwieldy, it, along with 
Oudiz and Sachs, is very useful for learning how to construct two-
country models of monetary policy. In addition, Rogoff considers a 
combined credibility-stabilization game by broadening the scope for 
strategic interactions among both policymakers and private agents. 
Rogoff’s paper makes one of the most fundamental points about policy 
coordination: In the presence of time inconsistencies, monetary policy 
coordination is not necessarily welfare improving. As emphasized by 
Canzoneri and Henderson, coordination has stabilization benefits, but 
Rogoff shows that noncoordinated policymaking tends to reduce the 
extent of the discretionary inflation bias that exists when coordinating 
monetary authorities internalize a desire to achieve short-run output 
and employment expansions via unexpected inflation. Accounting for 
time inconsistency problems thereby can overturn the basic Oudiz-
Sachs result that coordination yields efficiency in two-country policy 
games.  
 
Much of the subsequent literature on monetary policy 
coordination has applied the fundamental points of these pathbreaking 
papers to examine coordination of policies by central banks in two 
nations with separate currencies or by a supranational monetary 
authority that determines the money stock within a two-country 
monetary union. For instance, Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) 
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extend their original analysis by contemplating asymmetric 
disturbances. Lewis (1989) adapts Rogoff’s model to evaluate 
circumstances that would induce occasional, but temporary, efforts to 
coordinate policies.  
 
Collins (1988) and Melitz (1988) are examples of early efforts to 
apply concepts both from Canzoneri and Henderson and Rogoff to 
issues concerning European Monetary Union (EMU). Considerable work 
on this latter topic has followed; for more detailed overviews of EMU 
issues, see Fratianni, von Hagen, and Waller (1992), De Grauwe 
(1994), and Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and von Hagen (1997). Laskar 
(1989), Currie, Levine, and Pearlman (1996), and Dolado, Griffiths, 
and Padilla (1994) have extended the framework of Rogoff (1985b) 
and evaluate how the appointment of conservative central bankers 
might have contrasting welfare implications depending on asymmetries 
of disturbances, the extent of coordination, and the nature of cross-
country monetary policy spillovers.  
 
Most two-country-based analyses of monetary policy 
coordination consider a world in which nations might coordinate 
variations in their money stocks (or money growth rates). 
Nevertheless, another type of international monetary coordination 
setting that one might consider is a Bretton-Woods-type system in 
which one, perhaps “dominant”, nation pins down the underlying 
inflation rate for participating nations and coordinates this choice with 
exchange-rate target setting(s) of the other member nation(s). 
Canzoneri and Gray (1985) examine this version of the two-country 
policy problem, which some have also argued may be applied to the 
European Monetary System (EMS). (For differing interpretations on the 
issue of German dominance in the EMS see Giavazzi and Giovannini, 
1989; Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990 ; Hafer and Kutan, 1994; 
Camen, Genberg and Salemi, 1991; Kutan, 1991.)  
 
Under this perspective on a fixed-exchange-rate system, in 
contrast to the Rogoff and Lewis approach in which monetary 
authorities coordinate to fix the exchange rate, the exchange rate 
itself is a strategic choice variable for one nation in a two-country 
model, while the other nation chooses its money stock or growth rate. 
van der Ploeg (1989), VanHoose (1992), and Bryson Chen, and 
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VanHoose (1998) are examples of recent two-country interpretations 
of such fixed-exchange-rate systems. von Hagen (1992) examines a 
version of this approach in which one country delegates complete 
monetary policy responsibility to the other nation’s central bank and 
shows that in a repeated game this institutional structure could, in 
principle, yield credibility gains for both nations’ authorities.  
 
The instrument choice problem, nonstationarities, and 
currency substitution  
 
Considering money stocks/growth rates or exchange rates as 
policy instruments simplifies the two-country policy problem but 
obscures the fact that monetary policymakers typically use bank 
reserves or money market interest rates as their policy instruments. In 
the context of Poole (1970)-type analyses of the monetary instrument 
choice problem, Turnovsky and d’Orey (1986, 1989), Turnovsky, 
Basar, and d’Orey (1988), and Henderson and Zhu (1990) have 
explored the nature of the strategic problem that monetary authorities 
face. In particular, Henderson and Zhu consider a “battle-of-the-
sexes’’ game in which multiple equilibria arise from the interaction of 
policymaker instrument-choice problems in which a policymaker’s 
payoff depends on the other policymaker’s instrument choice rather 
than its own. They show that the introduction of additive uncertainty 
can reduce the number of equilibria and that under some 
circumstances unique noncoordinated equilibria can entail Pareto-
inferior policy instrument choices. In addition, Daniels and VanHoose 
(1995, 1998) have built on Goodfriend’s (1987) extension of the basic 
Poole framework and Sephton’s (1989) small-open-economy 
elaboration of Goodfriend’s model to show how international 
interdependence can make base drift and price-level non-trend-
stationarities optimal central bank policies with and without policy 
coordination.  
 
Seigniorage, optimal settings for bank reserve requirements, 
and currency substitution have recently received considerable 
attention in the context of two-country models. Most models apply the 
cash-flow definition to seigniorage (see Klein and Neumann, 1990; 
Gros, 1993, for more on cash-flow versus opportunity-cost concepts of 
seigniorage) to evaluate how optimal seigniorage would change in 
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settings with coordinated monetary policies. Drazen (1989) highlighted 
the importance of bank reserve requirements in relation to the 
seigniorage issue, and Bacchetta and Caminal (1992) and Daniels and 
VanHoose (1996) have explored this topic in two-country settings.  
 
Until recently, most two-country models of monetary and fiscal 
policy abstracted from complications introduced by consideration of 
currency substitution. Canzoneri and Diba (1992, 1993) are important 
exceptions. In particular, Canzoneri and Diba (1992) show how 
currency substitution and seigniorage concerns interact to influence 
the potential gains from monetary policy coordination. Proposed 
benefits of competing currencies, they argue, are overstated when 
fiscal authorities face tax collection costs.  
 
Seigniorage and fiscal policies  
 
Because seigniorage is a tax, it automatically relates monetary 
and fiscal policy issues. Such issues have been of particular interest in 
light of the Maastricht Treaty’s explicit fiscal constraints and of broader 
discussions of achieving greater fiscal coordination and convergence in 
Europe.  
 
Several papers have used two-country models to evaluate the 
fiscal policy implications of seigniorage with and without monetary 
policy coordination and with and without a common currency. For 
instance, Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) apply a cash-in-advance 
approach to investigation the interplay between seigniorage and direct 
taxes in a two-country setting. This leads them to conclude that the 
ability to spread taxes across the two funding sources is a crucial 
determinant, along with the magnitude of currency conversion costs, 
of the desirability of a common currency. In addition, Sibert (1992, 
1994) has imbedded an overlapping-generations framework to explore 
the allocation of seigniorage shares between two nations with a 
common central bank and the coordination of taxation and 
government expenditures in a common-currency environment and 
concludes that the gains from fiscal policy coordination are enhanced 
in a monetary union. Jensen (1996) examines analogous issues in a 
two-country extension of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) but which does 
not include a time-inconsistency problem for policymakers vis à vis 
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their private sectors. Sheen (1992) has conducted a simulation study 
indicating that the case favoring fiscal policy coordination actually is 
stronger than the case for monetary policy coordination.  
 
Of course, one difficulty is that analyzing fiscal policy issues can 
require attention to a number of problems, irrespective of the 
seigniorage and other monetary and financial interactions. As Frenkel 
and Razin (1987) have emphasized, failing to account for 
intertemporal tradeoffs that fiscal authorities and private agents face 
can lead to incomplete or even misguided results. In addition, Tanzi 
(1991) has discussed key issues that proponents of fiscal coordination 
must face, such as the inevitable asymmetries that create wedges 
among the fiscal policy responses of national governments. Indeed, 
Bryson (1994b) develops and conducts policy simulations within a two-
country framework and finds that fiscal coordination can increase the 
extent of fiscal flexibility required for governments to deal with 
asymmetric disturbances.  
 
Levine and Brociner (1994) find that the case for fiscal 
coordination is stronger when relative prices can change in a two-
good, two—country setting, because without coordination, 
governments have a greater incentive to improve their nations’ terms 
of trade. Again the Levine-Brociner analysis abstracts from time 
inconsistency issues that give rise to broader strategic interactions. 
More generally, as Tabellini (1990) has shown, fiscal policy 
coordination can internalize incentives that governments have to run 
inflationary deficits, and so fiscal coordination potentially can, like 
monetary coordination, be counterproductive.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty places explicit limits on fiscal authorities 
of nations that ultimately may choose to join the proposed EMU. 
Bryson (1994a), like Jensen (1996) and Bryson, Jansen, and 
VanHoose (1993), uses a two-country extension of the Alesina-
Tabellini (1987) model to show that fiscal policy coordination requires 
a sufficient degree of fiscal-policy flexibility and thereby could be 
hindered by such constraints. This buttresses analogous conclusions 
that Masson and Melitz (1991) reach in a simulation study of fiscal 
interactions among Germany, France, and the rest of the world.  
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Some have argued, nevertheless, that a monetary union 
promotes greater fiscal convergence even without formal constraints 
on fiscal policy. Glick and Hutchison (1993) apply a two-country model 
to evaluate the extent to which formation of a monetary union 
constrains the discounted present values of government expenditures. 
They find that although a monetary union tends to bring about long-
run convergence in discounted spending flows, considerable cross-
country variability nevertheless can arise. Jensen (1996) concludes 
that the case for fiscal coordination is strengthened by formation of a 
monetary union.  
 
Taking into account various combinations of potential channels 
of interactions among monetary and fiscal authorities, however, 
considerably muddies the waters concerning the desirability of either 
monetary or fiscal policy coordination. Jensen reaches this conclusion 
under the assumption that policymakers can honor commitments to 
private agents. Bryson Jensen, and VanHoose (1993) examine 
situations of committed or discretionary policymaking with respect to 
private agents with either monetary coordination alone or combined 
cross-coordination (but not within-country coordination) of both 
monetary and fiscal policies. They do so in a model with no 
disturbances and hence no stabilization concerns, yet they find that 
the theoretical case for either monetary coordination alone or for 
combined monetary and fiscal coordination is unclear.  
 
5. Issues for further research  
 
What more can we learn from two-country models of monetary 
and fiscal policy? We conclude by evaluating this question.  
 
Asymmetries  
 
A key assumption in most two-country models is that nations 
are symmetrically structured. There is an important advantage of 
using this assumption, which is that it greatly simplifies the solution of 
a two-country model while nonetheless permitting authors to make 
key points about the likely effects of policy actions or regime changes. 
An obvious and important drawback of the structural symmetry 
assumption is that gains and losses in monetary or fiscal unions can 
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vary based on a nation’s relative size (see, for instance, Cassella, 
1992).  
 
There are, of course, various ways that countries may be 
asymmetric. As noted above, they may have divergent wage-setting 
structures. As in Canzoneri-Rogers (1990), they may possess differing 
fiscal structures and tax-collection technologies. They also may have 
access to differing policy commitment technologies. Asymmetries can 
also exist because of the size and leadership role of a particular nation. 
For example, Germany’s monetary policy leadership position 
represents an asymmetry in the EMS, in that the Bundesbank may 
conduct independent monetary policy while other member nation’s 
surrender policy autonomy (von Hagen, 1993). This view has come to 
be known as the German Dominance Hypothesis.  
 
The most common means of introducing asymmetries into two-
country models, however, is through consideration of asymmetric 
disturbances (see Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990b; Canzoneri and 
Henderson, 1991; Bryson, 1994). A typical type of asymmetric shock 
examined in two-country models is one that entails a shift in demand 
from one country to another. This is the easiest form of asymmetric 
shock to consider because it involves analyzing shocks that have the 
same absolute sizes.  
 
It is arguable that we may have learned as much as we can 
from symmetrically two-country frameworks. Furthermore, resolving 
most issues concerning coordination of monetary, exchange-rate, or 
fiscal policies realistically require considering asymmetries that 
countries face. Researchers may need to begin sacrificing simplicity for 
greater realism in two-country frameworks. 
Implementability of coordination schemes  
 
Most initial research on mechanisms for implementing 
international policy coordination focused attention on the potential for 
supranational institutions to promote both policy cooperation or 
coordination. As Cooper (1985) points out, supranational institutions 
can negotiate the “burden-sharing’’ of coordinated policy schemes, 
reducing free-rider problems. This can be particularly important when 
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there is a large difference between the size of nations. Third-party 
organizations can also make possible the attainment of national goals 
that are in direct conflict with each other. For example, the 
International Monetary Fund can provide sufficient reserves to allow 
two nations to enjoy payments surpluses at the same time. 
Supranational organizations are particularly well-suited forums for 
policymakers to share information and ideas about the structure of 
individual economies, forecasts, objectives, and intended policy 
actions. Hence, policy cooperation can reduce the “harm’’ of 
noncoordinated regimes. Furthermore, supranational organizations can 
provide a leadership role when policymakers of the leading nation find 
it politically impossible or unwise to do so.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most important, these third-party 
organizations potentially can perform an important monitoring 
function. To the extent that these institutions can observe and report 
on the behavior of policymakers, supranational institutions can reduce 
the potential for policymakers to “cheat’’ on coordination agreements 
when the social and private gains from coordination do not coincide. 
Asymmetries change the distribution of the gains from coordination 
and can inhibit attempts to act collectively. Structural or goal-driven 
asymmetries, therefore, raise the issue of side payments and benefits 
from establishing third-party referees, such as supranational 
institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.  
 
Supranational organizations are unlikely to be privy to all the 
private information possessed by national policymakers, however. As 
pointed out by Canzoneri and Gray (1985), policy processes are 
complex and economic measurements can be ambiguous, making 
cheating relatively easy in an international context. This has led many 
researchers to focus attention on coordination schemes based on 
highly visible coordination targets. von Hagen (1993) concludes that 
because the exchange rate is a particularly visible target, a fixed-
exchange-rate regime can serve as a useful “surrogate’’ for 
coordination.  
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Policy timing issues  
 
An important feature of any policy analysis is the timing of a 
national authority’s policy choice relative to observations of 
disturbances and the choices of other policymakers. If authorities must 
act before they observe shocks, then there is little scope for 
stabilization policies, aside from, say, choosing an optimal instrument 
given knowledge of variances of shocks, as in Poole (1970). If 
authorities can wait to determine optimal choices after shocks occur, 
however, then they can affect the choices of private agents. This will 
be so even if private agents cannot themselves observe the shocks, 
since the agents recognize that authorities will partially offset 
disturbances (see VanHoose and Waller, 1991).  
 
A key implication of a game theoretic approach common to two-
country policy modeling is that the timing of players’ moves is a key 
determinant of the behavioral interactions among players. 
Consequently, the timing of policy decisions has a significant bearing 
on the equilibrium outcomes that emerge in two-country policy games. 
To this point, the literature has paid insufficient attention to this issue.  
 
Three- and many-country models  
 
In a global economy composed of more than 175 recognized 
political entities, there are some obvious limitations to policy analyses 
conducted via two-country models. As Canzoneri and Henderson 
(1991, Chapter 3) demonstrate, even in the absence of time 
inconsistency problems, policy coordination among two countries may 
reduce their residents’ welfare when the nations have a third major 
trading partner that is not part of the policy-coordination arrangement. 
An earlier version of this same basic point is made by Canzoneri 
(1982), who points out that a key issue in evaluating monetary unions 
is how the formation of a union between two nations exposes one 
member of the union to interactions between the other member and a 
third nation.  
 
Canzoneri and Henderson make this point in the context of a 
stylized framework in which two identical economies in combination 
are identical in size and structure to a third economy. In contrast, 
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Laufer and Sundararajan (1994) consider a three-nation model with a 
“mixed-exchange-rate’’ regime in which two nations maintain a fixed 
exchange rate vis à vis one another but permit the exchange rate vis à 
vis the third nation to float. They find that the use of such a mixed-
exchange-rate regime reduces the extent to which shocks originating 
in the third nation can influence outcomes in the nations with the 
fixed-exchange-rate agreement.  
 
Several authors have considered settings in which the “world 
economy’’ described by their models includes a large number of 
nations. For instance, Aizenman (1992) and von Hagen and Süppel 
(1994) have developed many-country frameworks to analyze policy 
problems faced by member states of a monetary union. Aizenman 
focuses on the inflation tax competition within a common-currency 
union, while von Hagen and Süppel apply their model to an analysis of 
the appropriate degree of policymaking centralization within such a 
union. Kehoe (1987) has provided a many-country model of fiscal 
policy interactions, which he uses to illustrate how increasing the 
number of countries pushes equilibrium fiscal policy choices further 
from coordinated outcomes. Sorensen (1996) applies a monopolistic 
competition framework to help explain why a subset of countries that 
produce similar goods and desire to embark on fiscal expansions might 
wish to coordinate their fiscal policies.  
 
In all of these multicountry models, the authors obtain tractable 
solutions by assuming that countries are small and identically 
structured, although they allow for country-specific disturbances. One 
possible direction for future work would be to try to develop many-
country models that permit some degree of “lumpiness’’ in the 
distribution of country sizes, perhaps by considering a world composed 
of groups of nations that follow into one of two basic size categories: 
small or large. Such an approach likely would lend itself to tractability 
while enabling a model to focus on issues arising from differences in 
countries’ relative sizes.  
 
Dynamics and informational issues  
 
Most two-country policy models are static, one-period 
frameworks. Of the papers discussed above, Kehoe (1987) is a notable 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Open Economies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1998): pg. 265-284. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
21 
 
exception. Likewise, real-business-cycle frameworks such as the one 
proposed by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) contain dynamic 
elements, although most of these latter models have not yet proved 
readily amenable to policy analysis.  
 
One simple way to take into account intertemporal aspects of 
monetary and fiscal policy issues would be to follow Bini-Smaghi and 
Del Giovane (1996) by considering multiperiod problems in 
policymaking and coordination. These authors provide a simple two-
period version of a standard two-country framework to evaluate policy 
criteria that might contribute to convergence among nations that join 
the European monetary union.  
 
Another useful extension of two-country models would be to 
consider the potential importance of imperfect information. Frankel 
and Rockett (1988), for instance, have provided a static framework for 
evaluating a specific type of policy uncertainty—policymaker 
uncertainty about the true economic model—and its potential 
implications for the desirability of policy coordination. They show that 
such uncertainty can significantly reduce the likelihood of sizable ex 
post gains from policy coordination. Ghosh and Masson (1991) show 
that this result hinges on the assumption that policymakers are so 
dogmatic that they give no credence to the possibility that the models 
used by their counterparts might be correct. Once individual 
policymakers allow for the possibility that the model used by another 
policymaker may be the correct model and evaluate this possibility 
based on observations of macroeconomic variables, coordinated 
policymaking dominates alternative uncoordinated regimes.  
To our knowledge, only two papers have considered both 
dynamic and informational issues in the context of a two-country 
policy model. Neck and Dockner (1995) evaluate a noncooperative 
open-loop setting, in which policymakers choose their strategies given 
information only about initial states, thereby committing themselves to 
particular strategies. They contrast this setting with one characterized 
by a noncooperative feedback equilibrium that assumes policy-makers 
choose their strategies given information about the current state. This 
is analogous to the standard, time-consistent discretionary policy 
commonly analyzed in a static framework. In addition, Neck and 
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Dockner consider a cooperative equilibrium in their dynamic two-
country policy game, which, because they assume that private-sector 
agents do not act strategically with respect to policymakers, yields 
Pareto efficiency. van Aarle, Bovenberg, and Raith (1997) examine 
both open-loop strategies and feedback strategies that do not presume 
precommitment in their analysis of a dynamic game between two 
national fiscal authorities and a central bank in a two-country 
monetary union. They conclude that feedback strategies, which 
arguably are a more realistic depiction of dynamic behavior of 
discretionary policymakers, lead to slower debt stabilization by fiscal 
authorities within a two-country monetary union.  
 
These recent contributions point toward at least one route that 
two-country policy models might be taken, which is to evaluate 
equilibria arising from dynamic policy games with alternative 
information sets. Another potentially fruitful avenue, which (to our 
knowledge) has not yet been investigated, would be to examine two-
country policy interactions in environments with asymmetric 
information. Any nation’s policymakers realistically possess private 
information that is not available to policymakers in another nation or 
to their own nation’s private sector (see, for instance, Cukierman, 
1992). Considering this type of policy environment could yield 
important implications about the credibility of international policy 
coordination, which is the key determinant of the potential for any 
welfare gains to arise from such arrangements.  
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